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Abstract 
In this paper we show that the abundance of a natural resource such as oil need not present a curse for 
the domestic economy, dooming the non-oil sector to secondary status and a long period of stagnation 
and decline.  Rather oil revenues can themselves be source of economy wide growth.  What is required 
is the judicious use of oil revenues, in our case the channelling oil revenues into government 
capital/infrastructure that will complement private capital.  We show that in such cases economy wide 
growth need not arise at the expense of other government services.  In the steady state government 
consumption can grow in line with private consumption, in our case at the rate dictated by household 
preferences. 
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** Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, K1S 5B6, Canada  
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we are concerned with the effects of oil revenues on the non-oil domestic economy when 
the resource is owned by the government and affects the economy through the government budget 
constraint.  There are at present a large number of papers that consider the Dutch Disease aspects of a 
rise in oil revenues through the contractionary effect this has on the non-oil sector (see, for example, 
Corden, 1984; van Wijnbergen, 1984a, 1984b).  In addition there are papers that focus specifically on 
the role of oil revenue in relation to government expenditure and its interaction with monetary policy 
through the budget and/or balance of payments constraint (see, for example, Tekin-Koru and Ozmen, 
2003; Kavand and Ferris, 2012). In this paper we investigate another dimension of having oil revenues 
appear in the government budget constraint by considering the role it can play in financing public 
capital. Turnovsky (1997), Cassouet. al. (1998) and Gomez (2004) have already established models 
where public capital is an important aspect of growth. We supplement this analysis by considering the 
optimal choice for allocating oil revenues (which are owned entirely by the government) to either 
consumption or investment spending and the implications of that choice for growth. 
II. Model 
Consider an economy with the following aggregate production function for non-oil output: 
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           (1) 
Here   represents non-oil output, and           represent, respectively, private and government 
capital.  The production function is assumed to be linear homogeneous and thus can be written as an 
augmented AK model. With this production function, the constancy of 
    
 
 in the steady state means 
that the ratio 
 
 
 will also be constant.  Hence in the steady state             can all grow at a balanced 
rate and an endogenous growth model can be developed on that basis. 
In this economy government capital is used in both the oil and the non-oil sectors.  Hence  in equation 
(1) above represents the share of government capital used outside the oil sector to enhance non-oil 
output,   .  The non-oil production function exhibits constant return to scale in private,    and 
government capital,       while increases in public capital relative to private increase non-oil output at 
a diminishing rate. To focus on capital accumulation we assume no population growth and normalize its 
size to 1.  This eliminates scale effects from the model and allows us to talk interchangeably of total or 
per capita values.  Implicitly all labour is used in the non-oil sector and oil can only be exploited by using 
government capital. 
Next we define the change in the government capital stock as: 
   ̇              ,          (2) 
where    is the share of government tax revenue and    is the share of oil revenues,    , going into 
government investment. For convenience, we assume the depreciation rate on capital is zero.  In (2) 
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government investment is an increasing function of both non-oil output,  , and oil revenues,   .  In turn 
government investment is used either to supplement private production (through public infrastructure, 
for example) or to enhance oil output.  Note that with      we get back to Turnovsky (1997) where 
public investment is a proportion only of non-oil output, i.e.,       ̇        . At the other extreme 
    and public investment depends only on oil revenues, i.e., 
       ̇       . 
Next we define the representative individual’s utility function as: 
 ( )  
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
  for          
             for              (3) 
Given that government consumption arrives as a non-tradeable good, the representative household’s 
budget constraint can be formulated as: 
  ̇  (    )   (    )               (4) 
where   represents the level of financial assets held by the representative household;  , the wage 
rate;   , the rate of interest; and     the tax rate on income.  In a closed economy   equals   so that (4) 
can be rewritten as the differential equation: 
     ̇  (    )     → 
  
  
̇
 (    ) (
    
  
)
 
 
  
  
.    (5) 
The Government sector faces the following constraint: 
       ̇                  (6a) 
which, given government investment, implies that government consumption and transfers become 
   (    )     (    )   .        (6b) 
This also implies that the government budget constraint is satisfied each period. 
The model assumes that oil resources and their revenues are owned by the government and that its real 
value can be increased by government investment:  
      (    )   
  where      .     (7)  
In (7) the flow of oil revenue increases with the amount of government capital but encounters 
diminishing returns in the amount of government capital used in the oil sector(    )   .The size of 
the parameter  reflects the efficiency by which public capital is used in the oil sector. With   close to 
zero, government’s capital investment adds little to oil revenues but as   approaches one, oil revenues 
become proportional to government investment. Changes in parameter  can be used to reflect the 
effects of other exogenous shocks that can affect the steady state of oil revenue growth such as: war, 
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sanctions against the economy, external changes to the foreign exchange rate etc. Taking the logarithms 
of both sides of (7) and the derivate with respect to time: 
(
  
  
)
̇
  (
(   )
(   )
̇
 
  
  
̇
)        (7)’ 
The growth rate of oil revenue depends on the growth rate of the share of government capital devoted 
to oil sector, as well as the overall growth rate of public capital.  With both constant in the steady state, 
the growth rate of oil revenues also becomes a constant. 
The economy wide resource constraint combines the household and government budget constraints.  
This is found by combining (5) with (6a), i.e., 
  ̇  (    )     →  ̇     (    )          
plus 
       ̇          →                      
gives 
                   .         (8) 
When the actual levels are replaced by their behavioral equivalents, (8) can represent the equilibrium 
condition,  
    
 , where the left hand side represents household and government demands and the 
left hand side represents the aggregate supply available to the economy as a whole: 
  
  (     )  (      )           
 .       (9) 
III.   The Social Planner’s Problem [following Turnovsky (1997)]: 
A social planner determines the time paths of   ,   ,   ,    and   and the values of   ,   , and   that 
maximizes the present value of household utility.  This is represented as a solution to the Hamiltonian 
 (                     )   (     ) 
          {(    )     }   
      {            } (10) 
where   and     are the co-state variables (current valued lagrangian multipliers)associated with the 
two capital stocks.  Substituting in the functional forms of our problem, the problem can be restated as 
maximizing  
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Substituting (6b) for   and then (7) for    reduces the scale of the problem to  
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The first order conditions for this internal maximum are: 
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Note that (13a) and (13b) are identical so that      .  Also (13a) or (13b) in (15) yields       . This 
in turn implies that          and that  
  
     
  or     
   
         (16) 
Using the equality of the multipliers also allows (14) to be simplified as 
  (
     
  
)
   
    (    )    
           (14)’ 
This implies that    is adjusted such that the marginal products of government capital in the private and 
oil sectors are equalised.  Next, 
  
   
  (      )̇ → 
                                                          
1
The maximization problem also requires the maintenance of the transversality conditions for private and government capital: 
    →       and     →         ; together with the initial conditions:       and         at t = 0. 
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 and dividing by       , we find 
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Taking the time derivative of (12) we find 
 ̇      
     ̇ which implies that 
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.  Substituting this back into (17) we find the 
household’s Euler equation as 
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The growth rate of consumption is a function of the gap between the marginal product of private capital 
and its opportunity cost, the marginal rate of time preference.   
The corresponding condition for government capital is: 
  
    
  (       )
̇ →     (  )
  [ (    )   
  
   
     
       (    ) [(    )   ]
   
(    )] 
         (    ) 
  
   
     
        
      (     
  
   
     
          [(    )   ]
   
(    )) 
          ̇    
      . 
Again using (13a)or (13b) and combining terms, this reduces to 
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      (    )   (    )    
     ,     (19) 
where the first two terms on the right hand side of (19) represent the marginal product of government 
capital (optimally allocated between the oil and non-oil sectors).  Using (14)’ the first two right hand side 
terms can be combined to represent (19) as2 
 
   ̇
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)
   
           (20) 
                                                          
2
Note that the substitution in (19) could have been done the other way to derive  
   ̇
   
    (   )    
     . This would 
have led to (20) being written in terms of the marginal product of government capital in the oil sector.    
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Taking the time derivative of (13), represented as g, we find the Euler equation for government 
spending as 
  ̇
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)
   
  }          (21) 
that is, the growth rate of government services is an increasing function of the difference between the 
productivity of government capital in producing government services and the rate of time preference.  
These two differential equations in combination with the ones defining changes in the capital stocks 
fully describe the movement of the economy.  Repeating the latter for convenience as (22) and (23), 
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after using (14)’. 
IV.     Steady State 
Because of the production and oil revenue externalities, output will grow through time.  Nevertheless 
even though the equilibrium levels of variables will not be stationary, they could all grow at the same or 
a related rate through time.  This characteristic is used to solve for a balanced growth equilibrium.  We 
later ask whether such a steady state exists and whether the model will converge to that steady state. 
Note first that from (16),      
   
  so that 
  ̇
  
 (
 
 
)
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          (24)  
that is, government consumption will grow faster or slower than consumption depending on its relative 
weight in utility. From (13a) and (13b) we have already found that         .    
Next, from oil revenues function in (7), note that 
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. Then using 
(14)’in the left hand side, we find 
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, that in the steady state becomes 
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In the steady state, the marginal product of public capital in the oil sector varies inversely with(
  
 
)
  
.3 
Next we define     
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 This implies,from (21) and (22), that 
  ̇
  
 
   ̇
   
 
  ̇
  
  [       
  (    ) 
 
 (    )    ] (    )
      .    (26) 
In the same manner, from (18) and (21) 
  ̇
  
 
  ̇
  
 
  ̇
  
 
 
 
{(   ) (    )
   }  (    ) (    )
          
 [
(   )    (    )
 
]  (    )
  
 
 
   .        (27) 
Then if we impose the condition for a steady state, 
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Imposing the steady state condition 
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  in (27) we find 
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We now have two equations to solve for     and    given the steady state values of the parameters 
        and   , knowing that         .  Hence we need two more equations for a steady state 
solution. 
First defining    
  
  
, we find that 
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Rearranging to combine terms, we find 
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In the steady state with     (
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Alternatively, the steady state share of oil revenues going into government capital equals (
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From (24) and the definition of     we can also find
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value of this as the left hand side of (31) and using (18), we find  
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Equation (32) implies that in the steady state, the more intensive is the role of public capital in non-oil 
production function (the close   is to 1) the larger should the share of public capital be devoted to this 
sector. Moreover, any external shock which causes a steady state increase in the relative size of 
government capital (ceteris paribus) will cause a decrease in the share of public capital used in the non-
oil sector (   ).4 
Finally let   
  
   
.  Then taking the time derivative and using (21) and (23), we find  
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In the steady state this becomes 
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In addition, note that we can write   
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 When       then     
  
  
   
 
 
(   )
 and the optimal proportion of government to private capital depends only on the 
characteristics of the non-oil production function.  However whenever       then 
 
(   )   
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(   )
       This means 
that he optimal proportion of government to private capital will always be larger than that implied by the non-oil sector alone.  
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Equations (27), (28), (32) and (34)’ all holding simultaneously are necessary for a steady state, but the 
steady state solution implied is difficult to describe analytically.  Hence we illustrate the simultaneous 
solutions for     and     given the steady state values of    and             in the section that 
follows. 
IV. Phase Diagrams: 
a.  The  ̇    curve(s) 
From (27), the   ̇    schedule is given (other than for     ) by equation (29). This repeated below as  
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 which implies that when    →   
 
 
.  Solving for its 
slope we find 
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which can be positive or negative depending upon whether {
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    (     )}       . There are 
then two cases: 
i.  If {
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    (     )}     
  
  
  . Hence it starts from the axis at   
 
 
 and decreases 
until it crosses the axis at   
 
  
[
 
 
(   )     (     )
]
 
 
  .  From (27) it can be seen that values of z 
above (below) this line result in   ̇    (  ).  This is represented in Figure 1a below. 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 1a 
Z 
x 
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ii.   If, on the other hand, {
(   )
 
    (     )}    
  
  
  , then the  ̇    curve departs 
from the vertical axis at   
 
 
 and increases, but with z increasing at a decreasing rate.  Similarly, values 
of z above (below) the  ̇    curve result in further increases (decreases) in z.  This is illustrated in Figure 
1b. 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 1b 
b. The   ̇    curve  
From (26) the   ̇   curve schedule can be determined (for other than     ) by equation (29). This is 
repeated for convenience as      [          
    (     )
 
 (     )      ]  (      )    which 
implies that when     ,  
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  .It follows that   ̇    crosses horizontal axis at 
  . Next,  
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  with 
   
   
  .       (36)                  
For values of x to the right (left) of the curve,   ̇    (  ) Hence the  ̇    curve can be represented as 
Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 2 
Z 
x 
z 
x 
𝑥  
?̇?    
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c. Steady State and Stability Condition 
Combining the two sets of steady state conditions from sections a. and b. above, there are two 
possibilities for       and      .  The first combines Figures 1a and 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3a 
The second represents the combination of Figures 2b and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3b 
Note that in both cases there is one stable and one unstable root so that the saddle-path property 
generates a unique adjustment path to the steady state.  Then with   and     in hand,            
and     can be determined from (32) and (34)’. 
 
?̇?    
x 
𝑥𝑠𝑠 
?̇?    z 
𝑧𝑠𝑠 
z 
x 
𝑥𝑠𝑠 
?̇?    
?̇?    
𝑧𝑠𝑠 
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V. Private and Government Consumption in the Steady State 
Once the steady state values of     (
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,     (
 
 
)
  
,    and             are determined, the 
other steady state values fall readily into place.  That is, from the non-oil production function,
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, the steady state output-capital ratio can be seen to be (
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  (      ) .  Using this and 
(18) we find the growth rate of consumption in the steady state as 
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Then because     (
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,     (
 
 
)
  
are both constants, private and government capital must also 
grow at the same rate as consumption.  In the Appendix we provide a proof that this growth rate is 
indeed positive. 
 
From (21), the steady state growth rate of government capital can be written as 
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  },        (38) 
where (32) was used in the last step.  It follows that when     private and government consumption 
will grow at the same rate.  Otherwise (
 ̇
 
)
  
 (
 ̇
 
)
  
 if    and (
 ̇
 
)
  
 (
 ̇
 
)
  
when   . 
VI.     Conclusion 
In this paper we have shown that the abundance of a natural resource such as oil need not present a 
curse for the domestic economy, dooming the non-oil sector to secondary status and a long period of 
stagnation and decline.  Rather oil revenues can themselves be source of economy wide growth.  What 
is required is simply the judicious use of oil revenues, in our case the channelling of oil revenues into 
privately productive government capital.  As we have also shown, the resulting economy wide growth 
and development need not be at the expense of other government services.  In the steady state 
government consumption can grow in line with private consumption, in our case at the rate dictated by 
household preferences. 
What is perhaps even more encouraging is that the conditions under which endogenous growth can 
arise are not that stringent.  First, the natural resource must be an important generator of revenue to 
the government and, second, government capital investments must be complementary with private 
capital. While not all countries are fortunate enough to find an exogenous source of revenue, a good 
many countries have their equivalent to oil. In addition, the economic literature provides many 
examples of government investment being complementary to private capital (Karras, 1996; Katrakilidis 
and Tabakis, 2001; Rashid, 2005).  For less well developed economies many authors suggest ways of 
combining synergies to create an even greater potential for complementarity (Evans, 1996).  
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Appendix 
A proof that the growth rate in the steady state is positive requires a demonstration that  
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  }   , that in turn requires (   ) (
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Proof: 
From equation (17) in the text we have: 
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This can be rewritten as:  
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Solving this first order differential equation, we find 
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Next the transversality condition for private capital in the model is     →       .    
Inserting (A3) into the transversality condition we find, 
    →      
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Dividing both sides of the equation by  and     : 
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We know that through the time 
  
   
 tends asymptotically to the constant steady state value(
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, the transversality condition can be written as : 
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Because the transversality condition must be satisfied in the steady state, it follows that  
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    so that (
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 (
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In the same way we can show that the transversality condition     →          implies (
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)
  
  . 
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